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Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-Law Adjudication 
Geo Quinot* 
1. Introduction 
One of the main characteristics of constitutional transformation in South Africa is what Etienne Mureinik 
calls the shift towards a culture of justification in which 'every exercise of power is expected to be 
justified'.1 He argues that within such a culture, constitutional rights 'are standards of justification - 
standards against which to measure the justification of the decisions challenged under them'.2 
The notion of justification as central to constitutional democracy in South Africa has been 
developed further by a number of scholars. Alfred Cockrell was one of the first to assess the 'value-
based nature of constitutional adjudication' emerging from the Constitutional Court's early 
jurisprudence.3 Cockrell's basic argument is that 'the explicit intrusion of constitutional values into the 
adjudicative process signals a transition from a "formal vision of law" to a "substantive vision of law" in 
South Africa' in terms of which judges are 'required to engage with "substantive reasons" in the form of 
moral and political values' as opposed to the 'formal reasons' that characterised pre-constitutional 
adjudication.4 Subsequently, in his well-known 1998 article, Karl Klare coined the phrase transformative 
constitutionalism in terms of which he focused in particular on adjudication and speaks of 
transformative adjudication as a mechanism through which judges can contribute towards social 
change.5 Klare’s analysis has been particularly influential in both academic and judicial engagement with 
the notion of justification.6 Central to his argument is an assessment of how judges should go about 
justifying the outcomes of their decisions within the framework of transformative constitutionalism. In 
my view Klare’s analysis offers a useful normative framework to understand the Constitution’s7 vision of 
the process of societal transformation grounded in law in South Africa and which, along with Cockrell's 
analysis of substantive reasoning,8 provides one with a standard to measure our progress towards 
adjudication that reflects a culture of justification.  
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1 E Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights‘ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 32. 
2 Mureinik (n 1 above) 33. 
3 A Cockrell ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 3. 
4 n 3 above, 3, drawing on PS Atiyah & RS Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative 
Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (1987). 
5 KE Klare 'Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism' (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 157. 
6 André van der Walt talks of the ‘cottage industry in constitutional theory’ that has been inspired by Klare’s 
concept, AJ van der Walt 'Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term' (2008) 1 Constitutional 
Court Review 77 91 n 56. 
7 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
8 In particular that part of Cockrell's contribution that builds on Atiyah & Summers' work (n 4 above). Before I am 
also criticised for not realising the difference between the arguments made by Klare and Cockrell (see T Roux 
'Transformative constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African Constitution: distinction without 
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The constitutional requirement of justification thus impacts particularly on courts and the 
adjudication process. On the one hand, courts are vehicles for enforcing justification of public power. As 
Liebenberg states, 'South African courts are therefore important institutions where deliberation and 
accountability for the fundamental normative commitments of South Africa's constitutional order are 
fostered'.9 But on the other hand, a culture of justification also insists on a particular mode of 
adjudication, of legal reasoning, by the courts as set out by Klare. Transformative constitutionalism 
requires the exercise of judicial power to be justified as much as any other form of public power.10 These 
two implications of a culture of justification for adjudication are indeed linked. As Liebenberg points out, 
the role of courts as sites of justification of public conduct in terms of the Constitution's normative 
framework will be undermined if adjudication itself does not reflect a culture of justification.11 Courts 
are thus required to both extract justification and reflect justification. 
Commenting on this dimension of transformative constitutionalism, Chief Justice Langa notes:  
The Constitution demands that all decisions be capable of being substantively defended in terms 
of the rights and values that it enshrines. It is no longer sufficient for judges to rely on the say-so 
of parliament or technical readings of legislation as providing justifications for their decisions. 
Under a transformative Constitution, judges bear the ultimate responsibility to justify their 
decisions not only by reference to authority, but by reference to ideas and values.12 
Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke puts it even more concisely when he states that ‘courts should search 
for substantive justice’.13 These comments capture an important characteristic of the courts’ 
justificatory obligations under transformative constitutionalism. Courts are not simply required to 
explain their decisions, but required to provide substantive justification within the particular normative 
framework of the Constitution. Judges are thus obliged to openly and honestly tell us what the 
substantive bases of their decisions are, including what values, policy objectives or political 
considerations truly motivated a particular outcome.14 Substantive legal reasoning is a key element of 
transformative constitutionalism.   
In this article I assess the progress towards the particular mode of substantive reasoning in 
administrative-law adjudication that the Constitution demands with reference to two judgments handed 
down by the Constitutional Court on consecutive days in 2009:  Mazibuko & Others v City of 
Johannesburg & Others15 and Joseph & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others.16 These two judgments 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a difference?' (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 258 n 4), let me point out that I am relying on Cockrell in this 
article only to the extent that he argues for a vision of law that allows for substantive values to directly and 
explicitly inform adjudication.  
9 S Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 45. 
10 C Hoexter 'The future of judicial review in South African administrative law' (2000) 117 SALJ 484 500. 
11 n 9 above, 47. 
12 Langa (n 6 above) 353.   
13 D Moseneke ‘The fourth Bram Fisher memorial lecture: transformative adjudication’ (2002) 18 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 309 316. 
14 Klare (n 5 above) 165; Langa (n 6 above) 353. 
15 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) (Mazibuko). 
16 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) (Joseph). 
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seem to represent contrasting approaches to legal reasoning in administrative law. It is puzzling that 
virtually the same bench17 in two unanimous judgments within a day sends out such mixed signals 
regarding the appropriate ‘conception of adjudicative process and method’18 under the Constitution. In 
my view, the progress made towards substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication and thus 
constitutional transformation in a case like Joseph is greatly undermined by the inconsistency between 
the adjudicative methods adopted in these two judgments. 
The analysis of the two judgments below19 is preceded by a brief exposition of the shift from 
formalistic to substantive legal reasoning in administrative law as the constitutional standard against 
which the judgments will be evaluated. But before I embark on that discussion, let me point out what 
this article is not about. I do not intend to assess the correctness of the outcomes in these two 
judgments. I also do not directly evaluate the socio-economic- or equality-rights dimensions of the 
cases.20 In line with the narrow purpose of the article, the analysis of the cases will only focus on the 
administrative-law reasoning in the two judgments, that is on the analytical procedure adopted by the 
Court. 
 
2. Substantive administrative-law reasoning 
Prior to 1994 the bulk of constitutional adjudication took place in terms of administrative law.21 Within a 
system of parliamentary sovereignty and in the absence of a justiciable bill of rights, this is not 
                                                          
17 The only difference between the Mazibuko bench and the Joseph bench was that Langa CJ served on the latter, 
but not the former. 
18 Klare (n 5 above) 156. 
19 Considerably more time will be spent analysing the Mazibuko judgment than that in Joseph for the simple reason 
that the Joseph judgment only comprised 78 paragraphs compared to the 171 of Mazibuko. Furthermore, the 
issues and arguments presented and dealt with in Joseph were much more focused than those in Mazibuko, which 
dealt with a large number and range of different issues. 
20 For a critical analysis of these aspects of especially Mazibuko see Liebenberg (n 9 above) 466 – 480; L Williams 
‘The role of courts in the quantitative-implementation of social and economic rights: a comparative study’ and D 
Roithmayr ‘Lessons from Mazibuko: shifting from rights to commons’ in this volume. Also see D Davis ‘Book 
review: Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution’ (2010) 127 SALJ 557  560-561, 
'Transformation: the constitutional promise and reality' (2010) 26 SAJHR 85 95-97; P O'Connell ‘The death of socio-
economic rights’ 8 July 2010 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636296 (accessed 4 November 2010); P Danchin ‘A human 
right to water? The South African Constitutional Court’s decision in the Mazibuko case’ 13 January 2010 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-court%e2%80%99s-decision-in-
the-mazibuko-case/#more-1848  (accessed 4 November 2010); P de Vos ‘Water is life (but life is cheap)’ 13 
October 2009  http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/water-is-life-but-life-is-cheap/ (accessed 8 November 2010). 
21 In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) Chaskalson P emphasised that administrative-law judicial review has 
always been a constitutional matter. At para 33 he notes: ‘The control of public power by the Courts through 
judicial review is and always has been a constitutional matter. Prior to the adoption of the interim Constitution this 
control was exercised by the courts through the application of common-law constitutional principles.’ 
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surprising. Administrative law thus became the ‘surrogate’ bill of rights.22 Adjudication within 
administrative law of this era was highly formalistic, (at least in part) a reflection of the pro-executive 
judicial mindset of the time.23 This formalism was most evident in the classification of functions, which 
attempted to categorise administrative action into various types and which in turn determined what the 
nature and scope of judicial review were in relation to the particular action.24 Thus, rules of procedural 
fairness (particularly audi alteram partem) only applied to ‘quasi-judicial’ administrative action and 
reasonableness only to ‘judicial’ and ‘legislative’ administrative action. This approach ‘led to a form of 
sterile conceptualism’25 or extreme formalism in administrative-law adjudication26 and by extension 
constitutional adjudication prior to 1994. Davis described this approach as a ‘jurisprudential slot 
machine’ in terms of which the characterisation of the action dictated the outcome in a mechanistic 
fashion.27 
Administrative-law adjudication is thus the ideal context in which to assess the progress of the shift 
towards transformative adjudication necessitated by transformative constitutionalism. It provides a 
clear benchmark of formalistic constitutional adjudication before the advent of constitutionalism in 
South Africa, which serves as point of departure to measure the shift.  
Against the formalism that characterised adjudication in the previous legal order, one can position 
the constitutional ideal of substantive legal reasoning that is central to transformative adjudication 
under the new regime. In this context Cockrell with reference to Atiya and Summers usefully describes 
substantive reasoning as based on 'moral, economic, political, institutional or other social 
consideration[s]'.28 Cora Hoexter has been especially influential in promoting the notion of 
transformative adjudication in administrative law. In her important 2000 article Hoexter calls for 
variability in the application of administrative-law rules, which involves a decisive 'movement away from 
conceptualism' towards substantive reasoning in which judges are 'explicit about the factors that inspire 
judicial intervention and non-intervention'.29 More recently she has argued that transformative 
adjudication can be viewed as a device that may free judges from the restrictive judicial method of the 
past, in particular in administrative law.30 She describes transformative adjudication as ‘what judges 
                                                          
22 See K Govender ‘Administrative law as a surrogate for human rights law’ in H Corder & L van der Vijver (eds) 
Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 45; Hoexter (n 10 above) 486; C Hoexter ‘The transformation of South 
African administrative law since 1994 with particular reference to The Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000’ unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009 11 – 12. 
23 See H Corder Judges at work: The role and attitudes of the South African appellate judiciary 1910 – 50 (1984), ‘A 
century worth celebrating’ (2010) 127 SALJ 571; CF Forsyth In danger of their talents: A study of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa from 1950 - 80 (1985); Hoexter (n 22 above) 13. 
24 See L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 344 – 353. 
25 Baxter (n 24 above) 344. 
26 C Hoexter 'Judicial policy revisited: Transformative adjudication in administrative law' (2008) 24 SAJHR 281 287. 
27 DM Davis ‘To defer and when? Administrative law and constitutional democracy’ in H Corder (ed) Comparing 
Administrative Justice across the Commonwealth (2006) 34. 
28 n 3 above, 5. 
29 n 10 above, 504 (emphasis in original). 
30 n 26 above; also see Hoexter (n 22 above) especially chapter 4. 
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must do in order to achieve the aims of transformative constitutionalism’.31 Central to this vision of 
adjudication is what she calls a ‘policy of anti-formalism’ that entails ‘substantive and purposive rather 
than formalistic modes of judicial reasoning’32 in terms of which judges acknowledge candidly what 
factors, importantly including extra-legal factors, inform their decisions. 
The notion of transformative adjudication does not amount to a call for substantive reasoning to 
the exclusion of formal reasoning. Form plays an important role in all legal reasoning. Indeed one may 
argue that judges cannot get away from form in adjudication, nor should they.33 Judges should not be 
allowed to decide cases with reference to any substantive considerations that they happen to favour, 
i.e. free-floating social and political preferences. The mode of reasoning that transformative 
adjudication requires allows for formal reasoning, but not formalism. Under this approach judges are 
allowed and may at times be required to decide cases narrowly with reference to concepts and the text 
of legal rules for example, but not in an abstract formalistic manner. Reference to form should not result 
in adjudication that is 'based on abstract and rigid constructs and reasoning ... unresponsive to the 
political and social context and power relations in society'.34 Judges relying on formal reasoning should 
acknowledge that such forms are dependent on substantive considerations, that they are mostly 
contingent and do not admit to only one outcome in a particular context. Transformative adjudication 
calls for these substantive considerations that inform the interpretation and application of legal forms, 
above all context in a particular instance, to be dealt with honestly and openly in adjudication. In 
addition, reference to substantive considerations alone does not convert otherwise objectionable 
formalistic reasoning into transformative adjudication. As argued above, the particular substantive 
considerations informing a decision must be rooted in the Constitution's normative framework. 
Furthermore, the substantive reasoning must be rigorous and theoretically well-founded, that is able to 
stand up to critical scrutiny. It is helpful to keep in mind that one foundation of transformative 
adjudication is the culture of justification. It is thus justifiable substantive reasoning that lies at the heart 
of transformative adjudication. 
The adoption of a policy of anti-formalism remains a challenge in administrative-law adjudication.35 
This is not only due to the lingering vestiges of the adjudicative method of the previous legal order or 
the formalism inherent in many administrative-law rules as they developed under common law in terms 
of such a method,  but is reinforced by more recent developments in administrative law. The definition 
of administrative action36 and by implication the determination of what amounts to administrative 
                                                          
31 Hoexter (n 26 above) 286. 
32 Hoexter (n 26 above) 287. 
33 See C Forsyth ‘Showing the fly the way out of the flybottle: The value of formalism and conceptual reasoning in 
administrative law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 325; JC Froneman ‘Legal reasoning and legal culture: Our 
“vision” of law’ (2005) 16 Stellenbosch Law Review 3 5-7; Hoexter (n 22 above) 37-38; Klare (n 5 above) 149, 160. 
34 S Liebenberg 'Socio-economic rights beyond the public/private law divide' in M Langford, J Dugard and T 
Madlingozi (eds) Symbols or Substance? The Role and Impact of Socio-economic Rights Strategies in South Africa 
(2012 forthcoming).  
35 Hoexter (n 26 above) 288. 
36 The definition of administrative action is found in s 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA). 
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action reasserts excessive conceptualism and thus formalism in our new ‘constitutionalised’ 
administrative law. The highly technical, conceptual and ‘cumbersome’37 definition of administrative 
action in PAJA has inhibited courts from breaking out of their old adjudicative ways. As with the 
classification of functions under common law, the law reports are still filled today with judgments 
struggling with the conceptual and formalistic question of whether administrative law applies to a 
particular action or not. The adjudicative focus thus still seems to be on the formal and technical 
application dimension of judicial review, rather than on the substance of either the applicability or 
content of administrative-law rules.  
Perusing the judgments on whether particular action amounts to administrative action (either 
under PAJA or directly under s 33 of the Constitution), one finds very little substantive engagement on 
whether administrative-law control should apply to the particular functions and much emphasis on the 
technical and legalistic elements of the statutory definition and the interpretation of the term 
‘administrative action’ under the Constitution. Following the identification of a list of factors in 
determining whether action amounts to administrative action under the Constitution in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union38  and the slicing-up of the definition in s 1 
of PAJA into various distinct elements,39 it has become quite common for courts to adopt a fairly 
mechanistic and formalistic check-box approach to the question whether administrative-law rules apply 
to particular conduct. Very little attention is also paid to the content of administrative-law rules within a 
specific context once action is found to be administrative action. 
Administrative law thus still suffers from excessive conceptualism and consequently formalism. It 
seems that the fundamental changes in substantive law introduced by the Constitution have not by 
themselves managed to shift adjudication in administrative law towards a transformative methodology, 
which endorses substantive reasoning that openly acknowledges the policy and political motivations 
behind particular outcomes. As much as it is the Constitutional Court’s role to act as final interpreter of 
what the Constitution means in substance and how legal rules are to comply with those substantive 
standards, the Court must also provide guidance to other courts on the appropriate adjudicative method 
under the Constitution.40 Such guidance should not only flow from the Court’s express instructions on 
                                                          
37 Greys Marine Hout Bay and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others 2005 6 SA 313 (SCA) para 21. 
38 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 143: ‘Determining whether an action should be characterised as the implementation of 
legislation or the formulation of policy may be difficult. It will, as we have said above, depend primarily upon the  
nature of the power. A series of considerations may be relevant to deciding on which side of the line a particular 
action falls. The source of the power, though not necessarily decisive, is a relevant factor. So, too, is the nature of 
the power, its subject-matter, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty and how closely it is related on the 
one hand to policy matters, which  are not administrative, and on the other to the implementation of legislation, 
which is. While the subject-matter of a power is not relevant to determine whether constitutional review is 
appropriate, it is relevant to determine whether the exercise of the power constitutes administrative action for the 
purposes of s 33’ (footnotes omitted). 
39 See eg Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 181; Van Zyl v New National Party and Others 
[2003] 3 All SA 737 (C); G Quinot Administrative Law Cases and Materials (2008) 211.   
40 See Froneman J’s remarks in Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape, & Another 2008 6 SA 320 (Ck) 
para 28;and Willis J’s remarks in Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC and Others 2010 
(4) SA 133 (GSJ) paras 16 – 17, 30. 
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adjudicative method,41 but also (and perhaps most importantly) from its own example. This brings me to 
the two 2009 judgments of Joseph and Mazibuko. In the following sections I will assess these two 
judgments against the need to move from a formalistic judicial methodology to substantive reasoning in 
administrative law.  
 
3. Joseph 
In Joseph the applicants were all tenants living in an apartment building in Johannesburg. Apart from 
rent, they also paid their landlord for their electricity use. The landlord (the fourth respondent) in turn 
had a contract for the supply of electricity to the building with the City of Johannesburg's wholly owned 
electricity services company, City Power (Pty) Ltd. The tenants thus had no direct contractual 
relationship with City Power. Following the accumulation of significant arrears in the landlord's 
payments to City Power, the electricity supply to the building was terminated. Notice of termination was 
given to the landlord, but not to the tenants. After a number of days without electricity supply and failed 
attempts to communicate with the landlord, the tenants contacted the City and were told of the 
landlord's arrears as the reason for disconnection. When a number of legal strategies failed to procure 
reconnection of the electricity supply,42 the tenants approached the High Court for an order that the 
supply be reconnected and a declaratory order that the disconnection without notice to the tenants was 
procedurally unfair under PAJA.   
The High Court refused both an urgent application for an order to restore electricity supply to the 
building pending a review application, and the subsequent application for reconnection and an order 
declaring the disconnection without notice to the tenants procedurally unfair.43 In both instances the 
High Court held that the tenants had no rights that were affected by the disconnection and were thus 
not entitled to the relief sought. In commenting on the effect of City Power's action, the High Court 
noted that 'City Power has taken action against the fourth respondent, not against the occupiers'.44 This 
conclusion followed on the reasoning that only the landlord had a contractual relationship with City 
Power on the basis of which City Power acted against the landlord in disconnecting the electricity 
supply. That it was in substance the tenants that were hit by City Power's termination of the electricity 
supply played no role in the High Court's reasoning. 
On direct appeal to the Constitutional Court, Skweyiya J (for the Court) framed the issue to be 
decided as 'whether any legal relationship exists between the applicants and City Power outside the 
bounds of contractual privity that entitles the applicants to procedural fairness before their household 
electricity supply is terminated'.45 The applicants argued that their constitutional rights to housing46 and 
                                                          
41 See eg Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd [2010] ZACC 28; S v Basson 2007 3 SA 582 (CC); Stuttafords Stores (Pty) Ltd and 
Others v Salt of the Earth Creations (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZACC 14. 
42 These included contacting the Human Rights Commission and the Rental Housing Tribunal. 
43 Darries and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2009 5 SA 284 (GSJ) (Darries). 
44 Darries para 42. 
45 Joseph para 2. 
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dignity47 as well as their contractual rights with the landlord were affected by City Power's decision to 
terminate the electricity supply and that they accordingly were entitled to procedural protection under s 
3 of PAJA.48 The respondents replied that no rights of the applicants were affected by City Power's 
decision and that they could thus not rely on PAJA.49 The respondents' arguments in this regard were 
premised on various conceptual aspects of the definition of administrative action and the qualifications 
on the right to procedural fairness in PAJA50 and thus invited the now familiar formalistic approach to 
resolving issues of this nature.51 In approaching the procedural fairness question the Court noted the 
two-pronged nature of administrative-law procedural fairness analyses: firstly the question whether the 
rules of procedural fairness apply in the particular case and secondly, if so, what the content of those 
rules are in the context.52 The Court held that the applicants were entitled to procedural fairness under 
PAJA and that the termination of the electricity supply without following a fair procedure vis-à-vis the 
tenants thus had to be set aside. 
Right out of the starting blocks the Constitutional Court expressly broke with the High Court's 
formalistic reasoning and cut through the legalistic conceptualism that characterised the High Court's 
ruling in denying a relationship between the tenants and City Power. In this regard Skweyiya J noted that 
it is 'artificial to think of the contractual relationship between [the landlord] and City Power as being 
unrelated to the benefits that accrued to the applicants under this contract'.53 With this statement 
Skweyiya J identified the real substance of the relationships at stake in this matter as his starting point 
and proceeded to assess the applicable legal framework against the substance of the matter, rather, as 
the High Court seems to have done, posit the legal framework as the starting point and assessing the 
substance of the case through that legal prism. 
This substantive starting point is thoroughly cemented by the Court's choice to engage with the 
content or substance of procedural fairness rather than the formalistic and conceptual application 
question. In paragraph 29, Skweyiya J acknowledged the legitimacy of the respondents' administrative 
efficiency arguments, that is the familiar argument that courts should not impose onerous procedural 
burdens on state administration, but pointed out that these arguments should not determine whether 
rules of procedural fairness apply, but rather what the content of such rules are in a given case. With 
this approach the Court continued earlier judgments such as that of Cameron JA in Logbro Properties v 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
46 Constitution s 26. 
47 Constitution s 10. 
48 Joseph para 12. 
49 Joseph para 16. 
50 Joseph para 26. The respondents relied specifically on the element of the definition in s 1(i) of PAJA requiring the 
relevant decision to have a 'direct, external legal effect' and the qualification on the application of procedural 
fairness under PAJA in s 3(1), which requires a material and adverse effect on the particular person's rights. 
51 See e.g. Joseph para 28. 
52 Joseph para 21. 
53 Joseph para 23. 
FINAL MANUSCRIPT FOR 
(2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 111 – 139 (http://www.constitutionalcourtreview.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/2010-Article-5-Geo-Quinot.pdf) 
 
Bedderson NO54 in taking 'important steps away from formalism and towards the substantive style of 
reasoning called for by the Constitution'.55 
The Court's determination of the applicability of procedural-fairness rules in this case also reveals 
admirable substantive reasoning. Rather than engaging in highly technical and abstract conceptual 
analyses of terms such as 'legal effect' and 'rights' to decide whether s 3 of PAJA applies, the Court 
focused expressly on the substantive values and factors that inform the need for administrative justice, 
that is the need to apply rules of procedural fairness. In this regard the Court emphasised the need 
'properly to instrumentalise principles of good governance',56 the role of procedural fairness in affirming 
the dignity of all those affected by public action and raising the quality of decision-making,57 in achieving 
'a culture of accountability, openness and transparency', especially in public administration,58 and to 
foster trust in state administration and more generally democracy,59 and finally the need for effective 
debt collection mechanisms.60 Against these factors the Court clearly and expressly justified its view that 
the scope of application of procedural-fairness rules under PAJA should be wide.61 This approach is an 
illustration of what Hoexter has called the 'preferable' mode of substantive reasoning, in which courts 
'decode the relevant factors, bring them out into the open, inspect them and evaluate them'.62 
The Court's reasoning in this part of the judgment is not simply substantive and therefore 
commendable. It also contains the required justification of the substantive considerations relied upon 
with due regard to the formal dimensions of the applicable legal rules to make it a good illustration of 
transformative adjudication. Skweyiya J clearly positioned his reasoning within the formal application 
framework of s 3 of PAJA, particularly regarding the required impact on rights. He did not disregard the 
formal requirements in favour of the substantive considerations highlighted in the previous paragraph, 
which motivated the application of rules of procedural fairness. Instead, Skweyiya J reconceptualised 
the impact requirement based on existing jurisprudence relating to the relationship between citizens 
and local authorities.63 On this theoretical foundation he proceeded to identify a number of 
                                                          
54 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). 
55 Hoexter (n 26 above) 292. The reasoning in Joseph strongly resembles that in Logbro in another important 
aspect, viz in the way that the Court in Joseph rejected the artificial contractual view of the parties’ relationship as 
noted above. With this approach the Constitutional Court followed in the footsteps of Logbro in rejecting the 
highly formalistic approach of Ogilvie Thompson AJA in Mustapha and Another v Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg 
and Others 1958 (3) SA 343 (A) to view an essentially regulatory relationship as a purely private contractual one 
thereby denying the application of public-law rules of fairness. See G Quinot State Commercial Activity: A Legal 
Framework (2009) 68 – 71.  
56 Joseph para 45. 
57 Joseph para 42. 
58 Joseph paras 43. 44. 
59 Joseph para 46. 
60 Joseph paras 49 – 55.  
61 Joseph para 45. 
62 Hoexter (n 26 above) 293. 
63 Joseph paras 24 – 25. He specifically relied on Sachs J's innovative conceptualisation of the relationship between 
homeless people and public land owners in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and Another, Amici Curiae) 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 343. 
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constitutional and statutory provisions that construct a public-law relationship between the authority 
and citizens relating to service delivery in the particular context. In this relationship he consequently 
identified a 'public law right to receive this basic municipal service',64 which in turn triggered the 
application of s 3 of PAJA. This is a fairly innovative and fully justified way of interpreting s 3 of PAJA. It is 
innovative because it does not insist on private-law rights or even fundamental rights as triggers for the 
application of procedural fairness, but recognises the adequacy of public-law relationships as founding 
rights worthy of (procedural) protection in administrative law. Skweyiya J furthermore justified his 
choice for this interpretation not simply by reliance on the text of the Act or the Court's authority as 
final interpreter of constitutional rights (including statutes giving effect to rights such as PAJA), but with 
reference to the clear constitutional imperatives of good governance flowing from foundational 
principles of the rule of law and public administration values in the Constitution. 
On the content of the rules of procedural fairness, the Court also broke out of the seemingly 
formalistic approach adopted in s 3 of PAJA. While this provision expressly recognises the contextual 
variability of procedural fairness,65 it nevertheless ostensibly lays down mandatory minimum 
requirements that administrators must meet in order for administrative action to be procedurally fair.66 
Rather than simply relying on 'the say-so of parliament or technical reading'67 of the Act, the Court held 
that the values underlying procedural fairness require a contextual application of these rules and that a 
strict interpretation of s 3 of PAJA thus cannot be adopted. In order for a court to fulfil its role in 
providing guidance to administrators on how they should go about taking decisions and avoiding the 
need for 'circuitous litigation', s 3 is read to confer a discretion on courts as to how the minimum 
procedural requirements must be enforced.68 This approach provides a clear basis for the continued 
variable application of procedural-fairness rules, which involves a substantive engagement with what a 
fair procedure would be in a given case. The focus is thus shifted away from a sterile enquiry of whether 
rules of procedural fairness apply at all and an automatic application of a fixed set of procedures if 
procedural fairness is held to apply. 
The Joseph judgment thus makes an important contribution to the development of a substantive 
model of adjudication in administrative law. It breaks with the formalistic reasoning style of the past, 
but also breaks out of the formalism ostensibly reintroduced in our administrative law by PAJA and the 
fixation with threshold concepts under our constitutionalised administrative law. The judgment shows 
the proper way forward in adjudicating procedural-fairness disputes with reference to the substantive 
values and practical factors that motivate a particular view. Following Joseph there is no excuse any 
longer for adopting an all-or-nothing formalistic approach to either the application or content of 
procedural fairness as a key component of administrative justice. In a very real sense Joseph thus makes 
                                                          
64 Joseph para 47. 
65 PAJA s 3(2)(a) states that a 'fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case'.   
66 PAJA s 3 (2)(b) states that '[i]n order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an 
administrator … must' take the procedural steps listed in the section, subject only to the strict departure provisions 
contained in s 3(4) and s 3(5).   
67 Langa (n 6 above) 353. 
68 Joseph para 59. 
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an important contribution to the further development of administrative law in the area of service 
delivery. Since Joseph can be read as largely having settled the question of the applicability of 
procedural fairness rules to service delivery decisions, the focus in future cases can properly now shift to 
the substance of the state’s procedural obligations in this context. However, this model of substantive 




Mazibuko dealt with the implementation of a new water provision system in Phiri in Soweto. Water was 
supplied to the mostly poor residents of Phiri on the basis of a flat monthly rate by the City of 
Johannesburg through its wholly owned water services company, Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd. In 
order to address massive water losses in this area, the City adopted a new plan for water provision in 
Soweto, known as Operation Gcin’amanzi. In essence the implementation of this plan in Phiri involved 
changing the flat rate basis of water provision to either the so-called Service Level 2 water provision or a 
connection with a prepayment meter. Service Level 2 amounts to ‘the provision of a tap in the yard of a 
household which has a restricted water flow so that only 6 kilolitres of water are available monthly’.69 A 
connection with a prepayment meter allows a set amount of free water per month plus any further 
water pre-paid by the resident, but shuts the water supply off when the pre-paid credits run out, at least 
until the next month when the basic amount of free water would again be available. Households in Phiri 
were individually given a free choice between these two options. However, a failure to pick either one 
resulted in the water supply being cut off. During the implementation of this new plan community 
facilitators visited each household to explain the choice between the two options and canvass the 
relevant household’s decision. Five Phiri residents subsequently challenged the new water provision 
plan on a number of constitutional bases. The specific challenge relevant for present purposes was that 
the installation of the prepayment meters in Phiri violated principles of administrative justice. 
In the High Court Tsoka J ruled in favour of the applicants.70 His reasoning on the parties' 
administrative-law arguments is noteworthy. He held that the introduction of the prepayment meter 
system amounted to administrative action and was thus reviewable on administrative-law grounds.71 In 
this determination the judge distinguished between the decision of the City’s municipal council to inter 
alia make use of prepayment meters as part of its decision to adopt Operation Gcin’amanzi on the one 
hand and the introduction of the prepayment meters in relation to individual households on the other.72 
While the former decision may not be reviewable (at least not on administrative-law grounds) the judge 
was satisfied that the latter was indeed administrative action. He subsequently found that there was no 
                                                          
69 Mazibuko para 14. 
70 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus 
curiae) [2008] 4 All SA 471 (W) (Mazibuko W). 
71 Mazibuko W paras 63, 70. 
72 Mazibuko W para 67. 
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legal basis for the wholesale implementation of a prepayment meter system and that it was accordingly 
unlawful.73 He also held that the discontinuation of the water supply resulting from the functioning of 
the prepayment water meters was unlawful, unreasonable and procedurally unfair.74 The judge rejected 
the respondents’ arguments that the introduction of the prepayment meters did not result in a cut-off 
of the water supply since residents could still get access to water beyond the basic free amount against 
payment of a fee. The judge noted that in effect the prepayment meter system did amount to a 
‘limitation, discontinuation or cut off’ since it left the applicants effectively without water.75  
On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s finding that the installation of the 
prepayment meters was unlawful.76 The SCA, like the High Court, rejected the argument that the effect 
of the prepayment meters was not to cut off the water supply on the basis that supply was still available 
against payment.77 The SCA noted that in substance there was no difference between the effect of the 
discontinuation of water by the prepayment meter when the credits ran out and the cut-off of water 
supplied under a credit meter by the service provider following non-payment.78 Since detailed provision 
was made for notice and representations prior to cut-off in the case of credit meters, the Court found it 
objectionable that cut-off would follow automatically without any clear opportunity for making 
representations in the case of prepayment meters when the credits ran out.79 In the Court's view the 
absence of any provision for notice and representations prior to cut-off under prepayment meters 
similar to the procedures stipulated in relation to credit meters indicated that the relevant empowering 
provisions did not contemplate the wholesale installation of prepayment meters.80  
When the matter reached the Constitutional Court, the Court identified two major issues to be 
decided of which the second was 'whether the installation of pre-paid water meters by the first and 
second respondents in Phiri was lawful'.81 This depiction of the second leg to the applicants' case is 
somewhat misleading since the arguments in this part went well beyond a narrow focus on lawfulness 
or even the broader notion of legality. The applicants also challenged the introduction and functioning 
of the prepayment meters on procedural fairness grounds and to a limited extent also on 
(administrative-law) reasonableness grounds.82 The second leg of the case can thus be more accurately 
described as the administrative-justice challenge to the installation of the prepayment meters in Phiri. 
                                                          
73 Mazibuko W para 82. 
74 Mazibuko W paras 92, 93. 
75 Mazibuko W para 84. 
76 City of Johannesburg & Others v Mazibuko and Others 2009 3 SA 592 (SCA) (Mazibuko SCA) para 58. 
77 Mazibuko SCA para 55. 
78 Mazibuko SCA para 55. 
79 Mazibuko SCA para 56. 
80 Mazibuko SCA paras 56-58. 
81 Mazibuko para 6. The first issue was whether the City's water policy and in particular the level of free water 
provided under that policy was reasonable in accordance with s 27 of the Constitution and the applicable 
legislation. The Court held that the City's policy was reasonable and hence constitutional (paras 9, 169). 
82 See Mazibuko para 105. 
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The Court held that the installation of the prepayment meters was lawful and thus reversed the findings 
of the High Court and SCA.83  
The reasoning in O'Regan J's judgment for the unanimous Court is interesting for a number of 
reasons. As a point of departure it is notable how O'Regan J almost exclusively focuses on the broad 
water-provision perspective, one may say the perspective of Johannesburg Water, in her framing of the 
'background' to the case.84 One is told of the significant water losses in Soweto and the problem of non-
payment, the plans the City made in response and the ostensible success and 'customer satisfaction' of 
the project. Notably absent is any detailed reference to the dire personal circumstances of many of the 
residents and the effect of the limitation of water introduced by the project on their lives, despite the 
detailed submissions made in this regard.85 My point is not that these latter considerations should have 
trumped the former or should have moved the Court to a different conclusion, but simply that the 
absence of any reference to these matters as a significant dimension of the substantive considerations 
informing this case is surprising. This raises a first red flag in relation to the reasoning of the Court in this 
case. One is left wondering why the Court is pointedly silent on these matters, or worse, why the Court 
seemingly opted to emphasise only one set of substantive considerations. 
The second noteworthy aspect of O'Regan J's reasoning is what may be called the 'recasting' or 
reframing of the applicants' case. The Court cast the applicants' argument in favour of a specific amount 
of free water as a minimum core argument.86 However, this is not an accurate depiction of the 
applicants' submissions as both Dugard87 and Liebenberg88 point out. Rather than arguing for a 
minimum core to the s 27 right, the applicants argued for the recognition of a particular substantive 
standard of water provision against which the respondents' conduct should be assessed in the specific 
context of the case at hand within the established reasonableness-review approach.89 This is not the 
same as the minimum core argument. The Court's reframing of the applicants' argument as a minimum 
core one, however, largely allowed it to simply rely on precedent, in particular the rejection of the 
minimum core argument in earlier judgments such as Grootboom,90 in dealing with this most challenging 
substantive aspect of the current matter.91 In short, by utilising a fairly formalistic reasoning technique, 
                                                          
83 Mazibuko paras 9, 169. 
84 Mazibuko paras 10 – 18. 
85 See e.g. Applicants' Submissions paras 10 – 12, 99 – 105, 146.3, 289; Amicus Curiae's Heads of Argument paras 6 
– 10 both available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/vQzMHkkz3V/MAIN/145660012/523/10473 (accessed 
18/11/2010). 
86 Mazibuko para 52. 
87 'Response to P Danchin "A human right to water? The South African Constitutional Court’s decision in the 
Mazibuko case"’ 17 April 2010 http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-
court%e2%80%99s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/#more-1848 (accessed 23 November 2010). 
88 n 9 above, 467. 
89 See Applicants' Submissions (n 85 above) paras 17.2, 320 et seq. 
90 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
91 Mazibuko paras 53 – 56.  
FINAL MANUSCRIPT FOR 
(2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 111 – 139 (http://www.constitutionalcourtreview.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/2010-Article-5-Geo-Quinot.pdf) 
 
the Court avoided the single biggest substantive question in the case.92 It is furthermore noteworthy in 
passing that this part of the judgment seems to endorse a decidedly formal conception of reason in 
terms of which the reasonableness test does not amount to much more than thin rationality. This 
reasoning leads to a largely process-orientated view of the enforcement of entitlements under listed 
socio-economic rights such as s 27.93  
The formalism of the Mazibuko judgment is, however, most evident in the Court's reasoning on the 
administrative-justice (second) leg of the case, that is the challenge to the lawfulness of the installation 
of pre-paid water meters. It is this part of the judgment94 that is most noteworthy for present purposes 
and that stands in such stark contrast to the Joseph judgment. I want to focus specifically on three 
aspects of this part of the judgment that illustrate the formalism of the reasoning employed by the 
Court. Firstly, I will deal with the Court's reading of the relevant Water Services By-laws in answering the 
question whether those by-laws authorise the installation of prepayment meters. Secondly, I will assess 
the Court's reasoning on the issue whether the functioning of the prepayment meters amount to a 
limitation or discontinuation of water to the residents and thirdly, I will deal with the procedural-
fairness challenge of the decision to implement the prepayment water provision system. 
The first issue that the Court dealt with in this part of the judgment was whether the installation of 
the prepayment meters was lawful in a strict sense, that is whether an empowering provision existed 
that authorised such installation. In reaching the conclusion that the City's Water Services By-laws did 
authorise the installation of prepayment meters generally, the Court employed remarkably formalistic 
reasoning. O'Regan J adopted the respondents' interpretation of s 3 of the by-laws.95 In this 
interpretation the description of Service Level 3, viz. a 'metered full pressure water connection', is read 
to include prepayment meters, in other words 'meter' as used here is read to include prepayment and 
credit meters. The Court adopted this reading on the basis that it is ‘textually permissible’.96 This is 
                                                          
92 This approach in Mazibuko strongly resembles the Court's approach to the interaction of labour law and 
administrative law in the context of public employment in judgments such as Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others 
2008 4 SA 367 (CC) where the majority of the Court virtually recharacterised the applicant's stated administrative-
law/PAJA claim as a labour-law/LRA claim. On the basis of this reframing of the case, the Court consequently found 
that the High Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter. In his dissenting opinion in Chirwa, Langa CJ 
specifically noted what he called the 'mischaracterisation' of the claim by Skweyiya J for the majority (paras 157 – 
159).  Although he did not agree that the Chirwa majority indeed recharacterised the claim, Nugent JA 
nevertheless noted in Makhanya v University of Zululand 2010 1 SA 62 (SCA) para 72 that 'a claim, which exists as a 
fact, is not capable of being converted into a claim of a different kind by the mere use of language. Yet that is often 
what is sought to be done under the guise of what is called “characterising” the claim. Where that word is used to 
mean “describing the distinctive character of” the claim that is before the court, as a fact, then its use is 
unexceptionable. But when it is used to describe an alchemical process that purports to convert the claim into a 
claim of another kind, then the word is abused. What then occurs, in truth, is not that the claim is converted, but 
only that the claimant is denied the right to assert it' (footnote omitted). See C Hoexter ‘Clearing the intersection? 
Administrative law and labour law in the Constitutional Court’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 209 220 – 221. 
93 The Court's approach to the reasonableness test in socio-economic rights adjudication is an important aspect of 
the case and beyond the scope of this article. See generally Liebenberg (n 9 above) 472 – 480. 
94 Mazibuko paras 104 – 158. 
95 Mazibuko para 109. 
96 Mazibuko para 109. 
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indeed a puzzling approach. While the Court continued to note four factors in support of this reading (to 
which I shall presently return), those were expressly noted as 'further considerations' that 'fortified' the 
interpretation already arrived at,97 in other words the interpretation is reached simply on the textually 
permissible test. The Court did not provide any reason why this interpretation should be favoured, or 
even why it should be the point of departure. One is left in the dark as to how this interpretation aligns 
with relevant constitutional rights, especially s 27 and more generally the constitutional commitment to 
social justice. The poor in Phiri are certainly substantially worse off on this interpretation, which allows 
for prepayment meters, than they would have been were such meters not allowed on an interpretation 
that would only allow credit meters for Service Level 3. On this latter interpretation water could not 
summarily be cut off when a customer fails to pay. The Court's interpretive approach seems particularly 
anti-poor and does not only leave questions unanswered, but also raises important questions. While the 
more standard formalistic approach to interpretation, namely the identification of 'clear language' at 
least attempts to justify its outcome on its own terms  by claiming that the text itself points inevitably to 
one particular interpretation, the Court's 'textually permissible' test offers no such inherent justification, 
while implicitly recognising more than one possible interpretation. The sentiment underlying the 
'textually permissible' approach is thus not necessarily formalistic, but the way in which the Court 
employed it in this instance roundly fails to reach the standard of transformative adjudication, since it 
offers very little by way of justification for the interpretation eventually adopted. The problem is thus 
that while one may agree that this reading is 'textually permissible', that is to say one way of reading the 
provision, it is not clear why this should be the reading. Clearly the 'textually permissible' nature of the 
interpretation can only be the starting point of the inquiry and the subsequent question is whether this 
interpretation is one that should be adopted. The latter question should be answered with reference to 
whether such an interpretation is the reasonable one to adopt within the normative framework of the 
Constitution.  
This brings one to the four fortifying factors that O’Regan J noted in support of her interpretation. 
Do any of these four provide a substantive basis for preferring the respondents’ interpretation over that 
of the applicants? The first and fourth factors are outright textual considerations and focus on the use of 
the term prepayment meters in various  sections of the by-laws, including the definitions of 'meter' and 
'prepayment meter'. On all of these the Court could just as easily have reached different conclusions on 
the text.  Whether the Court's interpretations are correct or the best ones is not the issue here.  The 
issue is that alternative interpretations seem possible and that the Court did not explain why it opted for 
those it did.  
The second and third factors seem at first glance to be more substantive. However, the second 
factor turns out to be also largely textual. The Court found implicit authorisation for the installation of 
prepayment meters in two sections of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (‘the 
Systems Act’). Firstly, the Court held that the obligation on municipalities to establish pay points for 
‘settling accounts and for making pre-paid for services’ in s 95 of the Systems Act implicitly confers the 
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power on municipalities to install prepayment meters for providing services, including water provision.98 
This interpretation seems a bit of a stretch. It is difficult to see how a general authorisation to create pay 
points can simply be read to confer the blanket power to charge for services in a certain manner. One 
would rather expect implicit authorisation in this regard to appear the other way around, that is explicit 
authorisation given for providing services at a charge (either on credit or prepaid) and finding implicit 
authorisation for the establishment of pay points to pay such charges in that explicit authorisation. The 
tail seems to wagging the dog under the Court's interpretation. But again, my point is not whether this is 
the correct or incorrect interpretation, but rather that this interpretation seems to stretch the text (and 
statutory interpretation generally) without any indication from the Court why one should do so.  
The second provision in the Systems Act that the Court pointed to is s 8(2), which contains the 
familiar residual powers authorisation, stating that a ‘municipality has the right to do anything 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of its functions and the exercise of 
its powers’.99 The Court accordingly held that the installation of prepayment meters was reasonably 
incidental to the municipality’s function in ‘providing services to citizens in a sustainable manner that 
permits cost recovery’ and hence authorised under s 8(2).100 While this may be true, the Court provided 
no justification for its view that the prepayment meters are reasonably incidental to the noted functions 
of the municipality. One would expect an assessment of the incidental reasonableness, that is the 
reasonableness of the implication of the power, to consider all the functions of the municipality and not 
just one. In fact the Court concluded its reasoning on this score by stating that the ‘interpretation seems 
constitutionally appropriate in ensuring that the City has the powers that are reasonably necessary for, 
or incidental to, the performance of its functions’.101 However, the Court focused in its interpretation 
exclusively on the municipality’s functions regarding sustainability with reference to s 152(1)(b) of the 
Constitution,102 but omitted any reference to the other constitutionally listed functions of local 
government such as ‘to promote social and economic development’ and ‘to promote a safe and healthy 
environment’, listed in the same section,103 or the development duties of local government listed in s 
153104 in its reasoning. Certainly for a power to be reasonably incidental to a statutory function it needs 
to be assessed against all the listed functions. At least some of the arguments made by the applicants 
and amicus curiae suggest that water provision on prepayment would be detrimental to social 
development and a healthy environment for the residents of Phiri, which may militate against an 
interpretation of the Systems Act read with the Constitution that implicitly grants the power to install 
prepayment meters. One is not told why the Court privileges one municipal function over the others. 
                                                          
98 Mazibuko para 110. 
99 Mazibuko para 111. On our courts’ traditionally conservative approach to the interpretation of this type of 
empowering provision, see Quinot (n 55 above) 46 – 49. 
100 Mazibuko para 111. 
101 Mazibuko para 111 (emphasis added). 
102Mazibuko para 110. 
103 Constitution s 152(1)(c) & (d). 
104 These include the duty to 'structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to 
give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the 
community' (s 153(a)). 
FINAL MANUSCRIPT FOR 
(2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 111 – 139 (http://www.constitutionalcourtreview.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/2010-Article-5-Geo-Quinot.pdf) 
 
Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning does not explicitly deal with the condition in the residual power 
authorisation that the implied powers must be reasonably necessary for or incident to ‘the effective 
performance of its functions’.105 Powers cannot be implied under this provision simply because they are 
incidental to a function, but only when they are incidental to the effective performance of that function. 
This effectiveness requirement again necessitates some form of reasonableness enquiry. One would at 
least have to engage with the question how the implicit power claimed (the installation of prepayment 
meters here) relates to the effectiveness of performance. In my view such an enquiry should at least 
consider alternative ways of achieving effective performance of a function when the claimed implicit 
power involves adverse consequences for a guaranteed fundamental right, such as access to water. The 
Court’s seemingly easy conclusion106 that the power to install prepayment meters is implicitly granted 
seriously lacks engagement with the substantive considerations underlying such interpretation.  
The third factor that O’Regan J noted in support of the Court’s interpretation of the by-laws is the 
only one that expressly involves substantive considerations. She noted that the installation of the 
prepayment meters is ‘an expensive and technically complex exercise’ and as a result that it is 
‘improbable’ that the by-laws would only authorise their use as a measure to address non-compliance 
by Service Level 2 customers.107 No further justification for this view is offered. One is not told why such 
narrow authorisation would be improbable or what the ostensible connection is between ‘an expensive 
and technically complex’ system and its wide or narrow use. Could one not take the view that it is 
precisely because of the high technicality and cost that the by-laws do not contemplate the wide use of 
such devices and limit them to a narrow application, making the narrow authorisation indeed probable? 
While at least expressly noting substantive considerations at play, this factor also fails to provide 
persuasive substantive justification for the Court’s interpretation. 
In the final analysis of this part of the judgment it is noteworthy that the Court acknowledged the 
textual indications to a contrary interpretation (as accepted by the SCA), but simply rejected them as not 
outweighing the considerations that supported its reading.108 What one finds here is mostly a match 
between different textual indicators (at least three of the factors identified by the Constitutional Court 
in favour of its interpretation are largely or purely textual and the factors noted by the SCA in support of 
its reasoning are all textual), which amounts to a formalistic approach to settling this question of 
interpretation. The only substantive considerations are those around the Court’s second and third 
factors, namely prepayment meters as a way of ‘providing services to citizens in a sustainable manner 
that permits cost recovery’ and the ostensible need for wide use because of the technicality and costs of 
the system. While the latter consideration fails to provide any causal link between the substantive 
factors and the interpretation, the former consideration amounts to a privileging of one set of 
substantive considerations above the (competing) others. On both bases the Court fails to provide 
substantive justification for its view.  
                                                          
105 Systems Act s 8(2) (emphasis added). 
106 Note the remark that the statute ‘clearly contemplates’ the implicit power, Mazibuko para 110. 
107 Mazibuko para 112. 
108 Mazibuko paras 113 – 114.  
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The problem with this part of the judgment is that while one may agree that this reading is 
'textually permissible', in other words it is one way of reading the provision, it is not clear why this 
should be the reading. The Court did not answer this latter question and one is left largely in the dark as 
to the substantive grounds, the true motivation, for adopting this interpretation. In particular there is a 
complete absence of discounting the applicable substantive right (s 27) in the interpretation. 
The second problematic aspect of the Court’s reasoning on the administrative-law challenge to the 
prepayment meters relates to the question whether the functioning of such meters amount to a 
limitation or discontinuation of water to the residents. This question arises because of the procedural 
requirements contained in s 4(3) of the Water Services Act ‘for the limitation or discontinuation of water 
services’.109 In stark contrast to the reasoning of both courts below, O’Regan J found that the functioning 
of the prepayment meters in terminating the supply of water once the credits have run out could not be 
said to fall under the protections contained in s 4(3).110 This conclusion is reached mainly on the basis 
that such a termination of water supply does not amount to a ‘limitation or discontinuation’ as 
contemplated by the section.  
The road to this conclusion starts out by labelling the prepayment meters’ termination of water 
supply as a ‘suspension’. This paves the way for O’Regan J to contrast such effect with ‘discontinuation’ 
as used in s 4(3), which in its ‘ordinary [dictionary] meaning’ means ‘that something is made to cease to 
exist’.111 Accordingly, she concludes that s 4(3) applies only when ‘a permanent discontinuation or 
limitation of the water service’ is contemplated.112 Noticeably absent from her reasoning is a 
consideration of what ‘limitation’ may mean in this context. Using the same dictionary (The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English) the ordinary meaning of ‘limitation’ involves ‘the act or an instance 
of limiting; the process of being limited’. Already it seems much harder to distinguish the effect of the 
prepayment meters from that which s 4(3) contemplates when it also refers to a limitation of water 
supply. It certainly seems at least possible to view the effect of the prepayment meters as an act, 
instance or process of limiting water supply. Furthermore, none of these definitions necessarily means a 
permanent effect on the water supply. Say the water supply is terminated today, whether under a credit 
meter for non-payment of the account or prepayment meter because the credits ran out, and only starts 
running again in a week’s time following payment of the account or purchase of credits, can one not say 
                                                          
109 S 4(3) of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 reads:  
‘Procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water services must– 
(a) be fair and equitable; 
(b) provide for reasonable notice of intention to limit or discontinue water services and for an opportunity to 
make representations, unless– 
(i) other consumers would be prejudiced; 
(ii)  there is an emergency situation; or 
(iii)  the consumer has interfered with a limited or discontinued service; and 
(c)  not result in a person being denied access to basic water services for non-payment where that person 
proves to the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority that he or she is unable to pay for basic 
services.’ 
110 Mazibuko paras 115 – 124.  
111 Mazibuko para 120. 
112 Mazibuko para 124. 
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that the supply was ‘discontinued’ or ‘limited’ for a week in the ordinary (dictionary) understanding of 
those words? The problem with the Court’s reasoning on this point is that it seems to deny even the 
existence of an alternative interpretation. It puts forward the interpretation of the section as referring 
only to a permanent effect as if that is the only viable reading. 
In support of her interpretation, O’Regan J notes that an application of s 4(3) to prepayment meters 
would amount to an absurdity, because it would imply that the municipality must give notice to the 
resident concerned every time that credits ran out. While this may be true, the underlying assumption is 
that prepayment meters can (or should) be reconciled with the requirements of s 4(3), thus calling for 
an interpretation of s 4(3) that would allow such reconciliation. The contrary argument is of course that 
the functioning of the prepayment meters is in fact inherently incompatible with the procedural 
requirements of s 4(3) and that the meters should be declared unlawful on those grounds as the 
applicants argued.113 The Court did not deal with this argument at all, but simply restated one part of 
the argument in support of its interpretation. 
It may seem asinine or petty to nit-pick at the Court’s interpretation of particular statutory 
enactments and to second-guess the Court’s refusal to adopt alternative interpretations as I have done 
above, but the Court’s particular interpretive choices in this matter held important implications for its 
adjudicative approach. By adopting the particular reading of s 4(3) of the Water Services Act, the Court 
avoided an assessment of the substance of fair procedures in cases such as these altogether. This is 
regrettable since both the applicants and the respondents made submissions to the Court on what 
would constitute fair procedures in a case such as this.114 The Court had an opportunity to substantially 
flesh out the procedural dimension of administrative justice (even though this part of the case was 
argued on lawfulness grounds). Rather than engaging with the important question of what fair 
procedures may entail in a context of high volume decision-making for which traditional, common-law 
notions of procedural fairness, as captured in the maxim audi alteram partem, seem ill-suited, the Court 
fell back on a formalistic and conceptual way out, which adds very little to the development of 
administrative justice. 
The most significant problem with this part of the judgment is the Court’s seeming denial of the 
real impact of the prepayment meters as voiced by the High Court. As noted above the court a quo 
rejected the respondents’ arguments that s 4(3) does not apply here, stating that the prepayment meter 
system did amount to a ‘limitation, discontinuation or cut off’ since it left the applicants effectively 
without water.115 Likewise, the SCA noted the real impact of the prepayment meters and accordingly 
found that there was no difference between the effect of the discontinuation of water by the 
prepayment meter when the credits ran out and the cut-off of water supplied under a credit meter by 
the service provider following non-payment.116 The Constitutional Court’s reasoning in contrast is 
troubling in the way that it is restricted to a rather sterile analysis of the words and dictionary meanings 
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of statutory terms to the exclusion of the real life effect on real people. This approach seems out of step 
with the vision of ‘transformative jurisprudence’ identified by Moseneke ‘which needs to contextualise 
violations within actual, life conditions’.117 
The third issue in the administrative justice part of the judgment that I want to focus on is the 
Court’s treatment of the procedural fairness argument.118 On this score the applicants argued that the 
introduction of the prepayment meters was procedurally unfair since the City did not follow the 
prescribed public participation processes. In this argument the applicants relied primarily on s 4 of PAJA, 
which provides the requirements for procedural fairness of administrative action affecting the public. 
The respondents replied inter alia that the introduction of the prepayment meters did not amount to 
administrative action and was thus not subject to PAJA and, even if it was, they acted fairly. The Court 
was confronted with a choice between formalism and substantive reasoning that has become typical of 
administrative-law cases as also outlined by the Court in Joseph. The Court could either engage with the 
substantive questions at stake, such as whether it is constitutionally appropriate to require the City to 
consult with citizens before taking a decision to change the water provision system and if so, what the 
nature and form of such consultation should be, or it could rely on formalistic reasoning that will decide 
the matter in a conceptual all-or-nothing manner. In Mazibuko the Court chose the latter route. 
In a two-sentence paragraph the Court held that the City’s decision to adopt Operation Gcin’amanzi 
was an executive decision that did not amount to administrative action.119 Accordingly, the decision to 
introduce the prepayment meters (as part of Operation Gcin’amanzi) could not be challenged on 
procedural-fairness grounds. In the Court’s view this was the end of the enquiry. The Court’s reasoning 
does not provide even a glimpse of why the specific decision to implement prepayment meters should 
not be subjected to administrative-law discipline. This is a good example of the overly conceptual 
formalistic reasoning that plagues administrative law and that is the antithesis of transformative 
adjudication. It offers no clues as to what ‘ideas and values’120 justify the outcome, namely that the 
residents of Phiri whose lives are drastically affected by this decision were not entitled to participate in 
(and thus inform) the decision-making process. Apart from illustrating the general lack of substantive 
reasoning in administrative-law adjudication, this judgment also curiously retracts from the Court’s (and 
interestingly O’Regan J’s own) earlier jurisprudence that attempted to provide a more substantive basis 
for the inherently conceptual nature of administrative-law adjudication. The absence of any reference to 
the directly relevant judgment in Permanent Secretary, Department of Education, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-
College (PE) Inc121 is especially curious in this regard. In Ed-U-College O’Regan J (for the Court) provided 
thoroughly substantive reasoning for why particular public action should be considered as executive 
rather than administrative and as a result excluded from administrative-law rules and scrutiny. Based on 
this reasoning the Court developed an approach distinguishing between policy formulation in a broad 
and narrow sense to determine in particular cases whether action falls on either side of the executive-
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administrative divide.122 Any mention of this approach is conspicuously absent in Mazibuko.123 While 
one deduces that the adoption of Operation Gcin’amanzi, including the decision to implement 
prepayment meters, amounted to policy formulation in a broad sense, the Court provides no 
justification for why that should be the case.  
The major problem with the Mazibuko judgment is eventually not the outcome. People are bound 
to disagree on the appropriate allocation of resources, especially scarce ones like water. One obviously 
cannot expect the courts to provide perfect answers as to how the cake should be sliced. As O’Regan J 
pointed out it is not the role of courts through litigation to ‘take over the tasks that in a democracy 
should properly be reserved for the democratic arms of government’ and to ‘require government to be 
held to an impossible standard of perfection’.124 The problem with the judgment in Mazibuko is its 
failure to contribute itself to the project of transformative constitutionalism within the proper realm of 
the judiciary by adopting a method of reasoning that is anything but a model of transformative 
adjudication in administrative law.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The detailed analysis of the administrative-law reasoning in Joseph and especially Mazibuko above 
serves to illustrate the stumbling progress towards a truly substantive mode of adjudication under our 
Constitution. The inconsistency in reasoning, judged from this perspective, over the five judgments in 
the Joseph and Mazibuko matters is cause for real concern. In Joseph the High Court adopted a fairly 
formalistic approach, while the Constitutional Court showed the way by overturning that decision based 
on truly substantive reasoning. In its judgment the Court expressly noted the inappropriate adjudicative 
approach of the lower court and continued to carefully map out (in terms and by example) what mode 
of substantive reasoning is required under the Constitution. In stark contrast, the High Court and 
Supreme Court of Appeal in the Mazibuko matter adopted a notably substantive approach to their 
reasoning, while the Constitutional Court, in a puzzling judgment, overturned the judgments below on 
reasoning that varies between highly formalistic and  substantive choices without justification. The 
puzzle is: what is one to make of these differences in approach. Surely one can always understand 
differences in outcome with reference to distinguishing facts and legal rules, but how does one explain a 
fundamental difference in adjudicative method? 
While I have analytically focused only on adjudicative method in this article, it should be apparent 
that reasoning mode and outcome cannot be separated in reality. The constitutional authority of a 
particular outcome is directly linked to the justification of that outcome through the appropriate 
adjudicative method. Any outcome, even one that ostensibly promotes constitutional imperatives, must 
be viewed as constitutionally suspect if it is not reached in a manner that reflects a culture of 
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justification. Reservations about the appropriateness of reasoning mode in a particular case thus 
automatically also cast doubt on the outcome.   
One of the main dangers of inconsistency in reasoning mode is that it invites speculation as to the 
true basis for a particular outcome, such as that in Mazibuko. If the courts, or at least the Constitutional 
Court, consistently adopted a highly formalistic adjudicative method with high levels of deference to the 
other branches of state, one could understand their function and adjudicative outcomes in terms of a 
particular institutional viewpoint of the constitutional architecture and the judiciary's role within that 
framework. One would then be able to engage the judiciary for example on its executive mindedness. 
On the other hand, if the judiciary consistently adopted a contrary, highly interventionist approach, one 
could engage it on judicial activism. But without a consistent approach and more importantly, in the 
absence of substantive reasoning, it is simply not possible to engage the judiciary on particular 
outcomes, because one simply does not know why that outcome was reached. One is inevitably left 
speculating about the motivations behind an outcome. This state of affairs is highly destructive of the 
rule of law and the core notion that outcomes should be justifiable in terms of the Constitution’s 
normative framework. The Mazibuko judgment clearly illustrates this danger. Given its lack of 
substantive justification for the eventual outcome, namely that the installation of the prepayment water 
meters in Phiri is constitutionally permissible, it is not surprising to find all sorts of speculation about 
what really motivated the Court. Such speculation includes the charge that the Court implicitly endorsed 
a 'neo-liberal paradigm' of service delivery125 and speculation on whether it was a response to  
the political turmoil resulting from the Hlophe and Zuma sagas which have buffeted the 
institutional legitimacy of the Court itself and focused renewed attention on the 'counter-
majoritarian' nature of the Court’s constitutional task, especially in the areas of equitable 
distribution of power and resources.126  
This last comment emphasises the critical importance for the Constitutional Court to lead the way 
towards transformative adjudication under the Constitution at this particular point in our constitutional 
development and within this particular context. During the period in late 2009 when Joseph and 
Mazibuko were decided the Court was probably at its most vulnerable since its inception.127 While the 
storm seems to have largely blown over, the Court still faces serious challenges to regain its high popular 
regard as a pillar of constitutional democracy. This challenge is perhaps most critical in the area of socio-
economic rights adjudication where, as Corder notes,    
the courts have to balance the exercise of their constitutional authority with an 
acknowledgment that the government of the day has an extremely strong electoral mandate to 
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refashion the distribution of power and resources in the country, in order to try to ameliorate 
and begin to reverse the dreadful inequities and injustices which past regimes have perpetrated. 
The courts, however, must exercise care not too readily to acquiesce in the policies and plans of 
the executive, lest the 'executive-mindedness' of their past comes back to haunt them. The 
judges thus have a difficult path to tread, especially in the socio-economic sphere, in which 
almost by definition the polycentric quality of decisions makes the judicial process alien.128 
Retreating into formalistic administrative-law based reasoning in such cases is not the answer to 
this challenge. The resolution is also not a simple matter of preferring substance over form, since 
baseless and one-sided substantive reasoning is as devoid of justification as sterile formalism. As I have 
tried to show in this article such approaches will only result in constitutional adjudication once again 
becoming a 'jurisprudential slot machine' where parties will have no idea whether their plea for 
constitutional justice to the Constitutional Court will be met by a Joseph or Mazibuko response. 
Transformative constitutionalism can never succeed as such a game of chance. 
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